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2
FEMINIST EMPIRICISM
Catherine E. Hundleby

F

eminist empiricism draws in various ways
on the philosophical tradition of empiricism, which can be defined as epistemology that gives primary importance to knowledge
based on experience. Feminist demands for attention to women’s experiences suggest that empiricism can be a promising resource for developing
a feminist account of knowledge. Yet feminists
also value empiricism’s purchase on science and
the empiricist view that knowers’ abilities depend
on their experiences and their experiential histories, including socialization and psychological
development.
This chapter explores the attractions of
empiricism for feminists. Feminist empiricist
analysis ranges from broad considerations about
popular understandings to technical analysis of
narrowly defined scientific fields. Whatever the
scope, feminist reworkings of empiricism have
two central themes. The first theme is the interplay among values in knowledge, especially
connecting traditionally recognized empirical
values, such as evidence and objectivity, with
moral and political values. The interplay of these
values undermines the traditional association of
empirical knowledge with individual knowers,
and the separation of individual knowledge from
the politics of communities, by suggesting that
the knower is not an isolated person. In this way,
contesting the nature or locus of the knower and
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developing new accounts of agency in knowledge emerges as the second theme in feminist
empiricism.
Most feminist empiricists employ the methodology for developing epistemology known as
naturalized or naturalist epistemology. Naturalism
is controversial, but it welcomes disputation,
takes up new resources for epistemology on an
ongoing basis, and encourages multiple approaches
to the evaluation of knowledge. This pluralism
undercuts naturalism’s and empiricism’s conservative tendencies and imbues current formulations of empiricism with radical potential.

Feminist Attraction to Empiricism
Empiricism traces in the philosophy of the
global North as far back as Aristotle,1 but it is
classically associated with the 18th-century
British philosophers, John Locke, George
Berkeley, and David Hume. Most recently the
noteworthy empiricists include the logical
empiricists as well as Willard Van Orman Quine
and his naturalist followers. All empiricists
emphasize the role of sensory experience in
knowledge—evidence, data, and facts—and
downplay the role of innate ideas and inborn
mental capacities, which rationalists have historically championed. Science provides especially
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good examples of empirical knowledge, and most
feminist empiricists focus on the types of knowledge produced by science. Although feminists
substantially revise empiricism, the traditional
association remains attractive because of its rhetorical power to engage practicing scientists and
academic philosophers. The naturalist form of
empiricism also insists on attention to the social
and physical embodiment of knowledge that
concerns feminists.
Empiricism’s concern with identifying and
making the most of the strengths of science provides feminists with a useful point of departure
for theorizing about knowledge. Many of the
early 20th-century logical empiricists aimed to
develop a science that would serve social purposes, including sociopolitical emancipation of
various sorts; and so the goal of an emancipatory science is part of the empiricist heritage
(Okruhlik, 2003). Attention to the strengths of
science supports the development of feminist
“successor science projects” (Harding, 1986).
Feminist experiences as scientists and feminist
analyses of scientific problems orient most
feminist empiricist analysis. Yet some feminist
empiricists consider knowledge in a wider
domain that includes everyday understanding
and that draws on diverse sources of experience
(Code, 2006a). The experiences from which we
gain knowledge do not all arise from scientific
methodology and may even include reading fiction (Code, 2006b). This broad view of experience is congruent with Quine’s expansive notion
of science that includes the experiential knowledge of people with no special training (Haack,
1993; Nelson, 1990).
Representing progressive concerns and liberatory values in empiricist terms is rhetorically
powerful, providing persuasive force and thus
strategic advantage that eludes more explicitly
progressive or revolutionary theories. Scientists
and Anglo-American philosophers of science
tend to conceive of science in empiricist terms,
and the public understanding of science follows
suit. In both these rarefied and commonplace
contexts, using the terminology of “facts”
(Code, 2006a), “evidence” (Nelson, 1993), and
“objectivity” (Longino, 1990) provides a valuable discursive authority.
Because of empiricism’s historical centrality
to the philosophy of science in the global North,

feminist empiricism is analogous to liberal
feminism. Both revise traditionally accepted
approaches to the problems at hand: empiricist approaches to scientific knowledge and
liberal approaches to democratic politics,
respectively.2 The political mainstream and the
culture of science give less currency to more
contested socialist, post-structuralist, and postcolonial theoretical orientations (Harding,
1989). Yet traditional rhetoric can convey radical ideas, and, when it does, it can be far more
powerful than the more obviously revolutionary approaches. Therefore, a radical future can
emerge from feminist empiricism just as Zillah
Eisenstein argued it does from liberal feminism
(Harding, 1986; Tuana, 1992).
The rhetorical advantage can be strategically
essential because it allows feminists to transform
the power of science.
The point of feminist science criticism must, in the
end, be to change science, and changing science
requires changing the practices of scientists. Hence,
scientists must be brought into the dialogue. Since
scientists are empiricists, that dialogue will have to
make room, at least in the beginning, for empiricists and for, at least as a topic of discussion,
empiricism. (Nelson, 1990, pp. 6–7)

Appealing to the traditional empirical valuation
of experience and logic provides a strategic
advantage for feminism. Yet, feminists must
rework empiricism and our understanding of
what constitutes scientific standards in order to
account for the role of sociopolitical values, as
must the not-specifically feminist promoters of
the empiricist tradition.
Many feminist epistemologists gain inspiration from a late 20th-century development of
empiricism known as “naturalized” or “naturalist” epistemology. Naturalists’ attention to the
situation of human physical and cultural embodiment abandons abstract ideals of knowledge that
assume an omniscient god’s-eye view of values or ideals, such as knowledge and justice,
and provides a concrete account of epistemic
agency—who knows. The same approaches that
naturalists reject on empiricist grounds feminists
reject for being implicitly masculine: disassociating ideal understanding from the material
realities of human existence excludes or at best
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further marginalizes typical or traditional women’s ways of engaging the world in the global
North and conflicts with the dominant ideals of
femininity. Women’s experience and knowledge
claims gain credibility from their grounding in
material and empirical resources for understanding. Naturalism suggests that new ways to
address and redress the traditional Western discounting of these forms of understanding can be
found in scientific and historical accounts of
knowledge (Hundleby, 2002).
Thus, feminist epistemologists, whether or
not they consider themselves naturalists or even
empir
icists, probably demonstrate most thoroughly the use of empirical data to scrutinize
science, which is the method of philosophical
epistemology that naturalists recommend.
Feminist naturalists especially—like any naturalists—appropriate science to provide accounts of
knowledge; however, as Phyllis Rooney (2003)
argues, feminist naturalism extends to reflexive
examinations of the underlying motivations and
worldviews of the social and individual cognitive
sciences. Back
ground assumptions—about the
nature of gender as a dimension for investigating
knowledge, for instance—are not merely noted
but subject to challenge (Rooney, 2003, p. 226).

The Spectrum of Feminist
Empiricist Analysis
Scientific knowledge is popularly considered to
be the best of human empirical inquiry, the most
systematic and responsible way to make sense of
experience. Yet feminist responsibility requires
attention to how sexism, racism, and other forms
of oppression manifest in scientific understanding, in the very context of scientific theories and
claims. Sexism appears, for instance, in cellular
biology, as part of accounts of fertilization familiar to knowers with no more science knowledge
than they received in grade-school sex education. A more technical area shows that sexism
can deeply undermine a whole field of study: the
evolutionary study of the female orgasm evinces
androcentrism, in Elisabeth Lloyd’s analysis
(2005). Resisting sexism that can be identified as
part of accepted standards of inquiry does not
require abandoning all accepted methods.
However, it does require questioning how these

methods operate in specified contexts, from
broadly cultural to narrowly academic domains.
In both academic microbiology and sex education for children and adolescents, the portrayed relationship between egg and sperm in
the process of fertilization reflects androcentrism and other sexist values and is often treated
as a fairy-tale romantic courtship. Images of the
egg or ovum range from whoring to dutiful
wifehood (The Biology and Gender Study
Group, 1988) and even to hunted prey (Martin,
1991). At the same time, the sperm appears as a
victorious hero reminiscent of characters in the
Odyssey or the Aeneid (The Biology and
Gender Study Group, 1988). Even using the
term “fertilization” to name the process that can
be more accurately described as “cellular
fusion” assumes an asymmetry in activity
(Longino, 1997). These models attribute to the
male sperm cell an active role that invokes
social norms of masculinity and attribute to the
female ovum a passive role. Both genderings
receive reinforcement from explicitly gendered
imagery and go far beyond the very limited
“sex” we can attribute to a single cell.3
The feminist empiricist response to sexism in
the content of science is to scrutinize the interplay among metaphors, values, and evidence:
“think through a particular field and try to
understand just what its unstated and fundamental assumptions are and how they influence the
course of inquiry” (Longino, 1987, p. 62). It is
not to demand that the egg’s activity be conceived in aggressive terms, which would only
play into stereotypes of femme fatales and
devouring mothers. Even equalitarian metaphors
may be problematic insofar as they encourage
us to anthropomorphize cells, argues Emily
Martin (1991):
Although the scientific convention is to call such
metaphors “dead,” they are not so much dead as
sleeping, hidden within the scientific content of
texts—and all the more powerful for it. Waking up
such metaphors, by becoming aware of when we are
projecting cultural imagery onto what we study, will
improve our ability to investigate and understand
nature. Waking up such metaphors, by becoming
aware of their implications, will rob them of their
power to naturalize our social conventions about
gender. (p. 501)
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For instance, we must beware how anthropomorphizing gametes attributes intentionality—
purposes and feelings—to the egg and sperm.
Intervening in defense of such nominal “persons” on the basis of metaphorical understanding might include technological and legal
interventions against the will or interest of the
very real people who produce these cells (Martin,
1991). A range of social and moral views, and
actions that science informs, can become loaded
with undesirable social assumptions and projected ideals.
By contrast with the breadth and variability
in sexist presentations of fertilization, Lloyd
(2005) identifies two specific assumptions in
the evolutionary science of the female orgasm:
androcentrism and adaptationism. Androcen
trism is being male centered or, more specifically in the case of sexuality, assuming that
females are like males (pp. 1–2), and adaptationism is “commitment to finding adaptive
explanations of a trait” (p. 14). The assumption
that males are standard or ideal is evident in
every available evolutionary account of the
female orgasm, in all of the 21 accounts that
Lloyd studies, and the assumption that all traits
are adaptations is present in 20 of these. Each of
the 21 theories fails to apply methodological,
logical, and evidential standards with which
their researchers are perfectly familiar and
which they otherwise accept (pp. 17–18, 221–222).
Adhering to these standards would prevent the
ubiquitous mismatching of the hypotheses with
the available evidence, a disconnect that reflects
androcentrism and adaptationism (p. 20). In
studies of the female orgasm, bad science has
been science as usual.
Whereas the feminist empiricist analysis of
fertilization directly addresses social complexity and scrutinizes political implications, Lloyd’s
analysis is much more constrained, restricted to
analyzing the methodological inadequacies of
this particular field. She “leaves undeveloped
some of the most interesting issues, including
the social significance of the science of orgasm,
the adequacy and limitation of sexology data
in the description of orgasm, and the role of feminist approaches to science beyond merely controlling for sexist bias” (Meynell, 2007, p. 219).
The contrast illustrates Sandra Harding’s distinc
tion between “sophisticated” and “spontaneous”

or “naïve” feminist empiricism. Whereas Lloyd’s
study exemplifies spontaneous feminist empiricism by focusing narrowly on standards of
testing, most feminist empiricists—more
“sophisticatedly”—attend to the dynamics between
theory generation and theory testing, and so to
the generation of testing standards and their
cultural impact.4
Deferring to existing scientific practices to
weed out sexism is a strategy defended by Sharyn
Clough (2003). She argues that feminists should
attend to the local empirical standards of specific sciences and debates and avoid vain
attempts to specify the general roles that values
have in science. To ask general questions about
epistemological justification and to seek a universal epistemology opens the door to questions
that lead to global skepticism or universal doubt.
We will be unable to claim knowledge of any
kind if we demand one theory of knowledge to
cover all types of understanding should we fail
to develop one that succeeds.
Clough’s rejection of broad conceptions of
knowledge is fairly unique, but many feminist
empiricists agree with her on the value of localized strategies. Helen Longino (1987), in her classic article “Can There Be a Feminist science?”
advises inquirers to refrain from attempting to
anticipate the ultimate shape of feminist science:
Accountability [to feminist concerns] does not
demand a radical break with the science one has
learned and practiced. The development of a “new”
science involves a more dialectical evolution and
more continuity with established science than the
familiar language of scientific revolutions implies.
(Longino, 1987, p. 61)

What remains is to “do science as a feminist”:
employ the methods and methodologies that
help to address the feminist concerns relevant to
that particular area of inquiry. Code (2008) also
advises modest goals:
Reconsider the value of the small: of small
projects that speak specifically from a careful
understanding to and about the precise circumstances of a particular species, community, group,
or society, and are understood well enough to
make such speaking responsibly knowledgeable.
(p. 199)
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Such localized engagement of feminist concerns
raises profound challenges to the way that epistemology and empiricism have operated in the past.

Themes in Feminist Empiricism
Feminist revisions of empiricism focus on two
related themes: epistemic values and epistemic
agency. First, sociopolitical values have cognitive or epistemic implications and help to warrant beliefs and theories, argue feminist
empiricists. Defying the traditional distinction
between epistemic and political values raises
questions for feminist empiricists about the significance of communities for knowledge. For
some feminist empiricists, not the individual
person but instead the community is the locus of
knowledge. For all, the agent or the knowing
subject is no longer the isolated abstract individual that was identified in earlier epistemologies of the global North, a challenge that provides
the second theme in feminist empiricism.

What Do We Want? Epistemic
and Political Values
Feminist empiricist analysis considers the
interplay among various forms of values or theoretical virtues: empirical values, such as predictive accuracy or testability; other epistemic values,
such as simplicity; and non-epistemic values, from
subjective or personal values to moral or ethical
values and more broadly political or cultural values. In this section, I will explain the standardly
recognized empirical and epistemic values and
the arguments by feminist empiricists that they
are not sufficient to eliminate the political content
of scientific theory. Considering the interplay of
non-epistemic with epistemic values not only
explains observations of sexism in science but
also suggests various roles that feminist values
might take in science. There is little agreement
regarding how scientists and knowers more generally should integrate feminist values as part of
their methods of inquiry. Yet the feminist critiques of science have provided ample evidence
that feminist practice and values improve scientific knowledge.
The most generally accepted of the cognitive
or epistemological values has been truth, which

carries realist metaphysical assumptions of an
independent exterior world or at least a representationalist view of mind. To avoid such
metaphysical implications, most empiricist philosophers of science follow Quine and Thomas
Kuhn (1977), who speak instead of truth about
empirical adequacy, which includes predictive
accuracy and retrodictive accuracy (explaining
past observations). Likewise, facticity, rationality,
evidence, and objectivity are values that provide
standards for scientific testing and evaluation.
The operation of these general epistemological
values is the central concern for feminist empiricists, a project that complements feminist
standpoint theorists’ concern with heuristics and
the generation of ideas.5
Many feminist and not specifically feminist
empiricists (explicitly Longino and Miriam
Solomon) hope to steer a middle course between
traditional empiricism and the social constructivism of the Strong Programme in the sociology
of science that is sometimes read into early Kuhn
(1962). The logical empiricists recognized that
political matters and social and subjective inspiration affect how theories are generated. Yet they
argued that processes of testing or of rational
theory choice using distinctly epistemic values
eliminate those influences and distinguish views
with purely epistemological authority.
Contemporary empiricists, whether or not
they identify as feminist, maintain that general
epistemic values such as evidence or rationality
are manifested or articulated in scientific practice
in the form of the following more specific qualities of theories or beliefs: ontological simplicity
(Ockham’s razor), modesty, internal coherence,
external consistency (including theoretical conservatism), predictability, explanatory power
(also described as unifying power, generality, or
breadth of scope), testability (also described as
refutability or predictive accuracy), and theoretical fruitfulness (or fertility). Thus, following
Quine and Thomas Kuhn, values receive general
acceptance from (mainstream) empiricist philosophy of science.
Whichever of the cognitive values make up the
basis for scientific evaluation, the list is never
exhaustive for contemporary empiricists, nor can
the individual values be applied in a straightforward algorithmic manner. Rarely do we find consensus among theorists about which values are
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important or how to apply them, or even how to
weigh them against each other. Theoretical fertility
or productivity, for instance, can be interpreted in
different ways by different investigators and in the
context of different research programs—we may
ask “fruitful for what?” Also, fruitfulness may be
weighted in various ways relative to the other cognitive values (Rooney, 1993), as both Kuhn and
Quine recognize. For instance, the detailed focus
necessary for an accurate account clearly conflicts
with the applicability of that account to a range of
phenomena in a range of situations that constitutes
breadth of scope (Longino, 1997).
Feminists differ from other contemporary
empiricists in arguing that how we identify,
interpret, and weigh cognitive values also
reflects political commitments (whether we realize this or not). “Responsibility and accountability requirements join verifiability high on the
epistemic agenda as epistemic and moral-political issues coalesce and as statements of fact take
on a less self-evidently factual demeanour”
(Code, 2006a, p. 128). Scientific method and
rational theory choice—articulated in terms of
predictive success, observation independence,
and explanatory power, by Richmond Campbell
(1997, pp. 25–27)—are not sufficient to eliminate sociopolitical influences.
[T]here are standards of rational acceptability that
are independent of particular interests and values
but . . . satisfaction of these standards by a theory
or hypothesis does not guarantee that the theory or
hypothesis in question is value- or interest-free.
(Longino, 1990, p. 12)

Consider how gender roles influence cellular
biology and androcentrism influences evolutionary biology, as I described previously, and
how racism has informed the study of intelligence (Gould, 1996). Such non-epistemological
values from the context of theory generation
remain present in those theories that succeed.
Testing only shows a claim to be epistemically
superior among the available contending theories,
so the process can entrench sociopolitical values
in scientific practice, as Kathleen Okruhlik argues:
If [the available] theories have been generated by
males operating in a deeply sexist culture, then it
is likely that they will all be contaminated by sexism.

Non-sexist rivals will never even be generated.
Hence the theory which is selected by the canons
of scientific appraisal will simply be the best of
the sexist rivals; and the very content of science
will be sexist, no matter how rigorously we apply
objective standards of assessment in the context of
justification. In fact, the best of the sexist theories
will emerge more and more highly confirmed after
successive tests. (Okruhlik, 1994, pp. 34–35)

Social ideology and sociopolitical values play as
substantial a role as “stereotypically scientific
issues of evidence and logic” in scientific
knowledge (Longino, 1990, p. 3). Both science
in general or “as usual” and particular cases of
incompetent or “bad” science involve more than
purely cognitive or logical concerns.
A more complicated example of the intermingling of political with epistemic values is
Longino’s feminist defense of a social-cognitive
model over the linear-hormonal, or “biological
determinist,” model for gendered differences in
human physical and cognitive behavior. No
purely cognitive or epistemic decision between
the two models seems available according to
Longino’s original (1990) analysis, but the values
of theoretical unification and simplicity that support the linear-hormonal model cannot be viewed
only in cognitive terms. Part of the constitutive
force of “simplicity” in this model is due to the
operation of gender dimorphism as part of the
motivation for the very understanding of biological determinism itself, although gender dimorphism is biologically contested (Rooney, 1993,
p. 18). Gender dimorphism, which is assuming
that bodies take two distinctly gendered forms,
offers the valued “simplicity” in this case because
of its resonance with existing social hierarchies;
so it seemed rationally preferable because it was
socially preferred.
Likewise feminist interests support certain
cognitive values over others, and empiricism can
support the role of feminist politics in good scientific practice (Campbell, 1998). Yet, feminist
empiricists do not advocate any specific methodologies, and some refuse to search for definitive
general criteria for evaluating the content of
knowledge, even specifically scientific knowledge. Instead of viewing science as a product,
Longino urges that we treat it as a practice, that
feminist science is not an abstract ideal but a
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matter of “doing science as a feminist” (Longino,
1990, p. 188). “We can . . . fashion and favor
research programs that are consistent with the
values and commitments we express in the rest
of our lives” (Longino, 1990, p. 191).
The feminist critiques of science have revealed
certain patterns in valuation, a constellation of
theoretical values that Longino has started to
catalog (1997). Like the traditional empirical
values, the feminist set begins with empirical adequacy or accuracy. This accepted epistemic value
supports a specifically feminist value: “to reveal
both gender in the phenomena and gender bias in
the accounting of them” (Longino, 1997, p. 45).
The value of revealing gender is served by novelty, ontological heterogeneity, and mutuality of
interaction in the content of theories and research
programs. These values are neither uniquely nor
intrinsically feminist, which holds also for values of concern to feminists that are not (or are
only distantly) connected to empirical adequacy:
applying science to meet current human needs,
such as those traditionally ministered by women,
and diffusing scientific power by encouraging
general access and participation in science
(Longino, 1997, pp. 50–51). The feminist values
may complement the more standard set or provide
alternatives. For instance, ontological heterogeneity conflicts with an ontological interpretation
of (standardly valued) simplicity.
The necessity for sociopolitical values in science implies that nastier—sexist, racist, and so
forth—sociopolitical values could be justified
and are part of not just bad science but science as
usual. Criticizing the role of such values makes it
difficult to support a positive role for feminist
values in knowledge, a problem described by
Louise Antony as the “bias paradox.” 6 Yet some
political values, such as feminism, can be
revealed to better support empirical adequacy
than others. “Doing science as a feminist” has
produced any number of novel and empirically
successful theories. Early feminist critiques of
science led, for instance, to recognizing the activity of the ovum and to developing the “womanthe-gatherer” hypothesis in anthropology that has
proved more successful than the previous “manthe-hunter” alternative (Longino & Doell, 1983).
This pattern provides evidence of the empirical
adequacy of at least some feminist values in one
field at a particular point in its development.

The success of multiple feminist critiques of
science indicates that feminism has a general
empirical adequacy, at least at this point in the
progress of science. The empirical advantage is
due, at least in part, to feminist attention to the
role of values, especially political values, in science; these are not generally recognized components of epistemology or methodology. “Political
critique of accepted epistemic values helps reveal
existing incoherences in our cognitive practices
and suggests remedial options” (Hundleby, 2002,
p. 263). A broader base for criticism becomes
available, as does a broader horizon for action,
because we consider science to be part of the
larger community.
A certain number of feminist empiricists,
notably Lynn Hankinson Nelson, stress that the
operation of science subjects political values to
ordinary standards of criticism by which people
can dismiss them. Naturalists such as Nelson use
scientific understandings of human knowers to
account for knowledge, but the standards draw
from Quine’s broad notion of science, which incorporates the richness of commonsense reasoning
that can be used as a basis for criticism (Nelson,
1990). Perhaps the most general value that
requires attention from naturalists is the value of
human survival (Code, 1996) because that value
underpins human nature according to evolutionary biology. The moral and sociopolitical values
dismissed by Quine for being the result of natural selection are vindicated by those origins,
according to Nelson. She argues that their evolutionary success provides scientific reason to
consider the values cognitively good: they meet
the common practical needs of societies and of
humanity (Nelson, 1990, p. 133). We may use
these same standards to evaluate which moral
and sociopolitical values have empirical value.
Because it reconfigures the role of bias in science, there is no need to distinguish between
good and bad bias in Miriam Solomon’s “social
empiricism” (2001). She replaces the traditional
epistemological distinction between epistemic or
rational (“cold”) and non-epistemic or biasing
(“hot”) factors in how scientists decide among
theories with an account of empirical and nonempirical decision vectors. Empirical decision
vectors include salience of data, availability of
data, egocentric bias toward one’s own data (noncognitive—but driven by data!), and preference
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for a theory that generates novel predictions.
Non-empirical decision vectors include ideology,
pride, conservativeness, radicalism, elegance,
competitiveness, and peer pressure; the list goes
on and so includes much more than the sociopolitical values addressed by other feminist empiricists. Solomon argues that all sorts of personal
and social values can be part of the motivation
behind states of science that are justified. It is the
appropriate social distribution of decision vectors that makes a scientific decision rational, not
whether any particular vectors are present. The
only relevant distinction among values is whether
they are empirical.
Solomon bucks intuition and argues that
dissent—and not consensus—is the scientific
norm, in the sense of being the more common
and general state of science. Rational dissent
occurs under the following circumstances:
1. All theories under consideration have some
empirical success (explain some observations).
2. All empirical vectors are distributed proportionately to the empirical success of each theory
(productive scientific methods fall under theories proportional to their empirical success).
3. The nonempirical vectors are equally distributed.

Dissent occurs more frequently than consensus
partly because only a very specific configuration
of the decision vectors can justify consensus.7
Forming consensus is only appropriate when all
the empirical success supports one theory, making it a limiting case of dissent.
Thus Solomon, like Nelson, maintains that
we can assess the scientific significance of moral
and sociopolitical values. Such an assessment
will only proceed in the long term, however.
Epistemic practices at their best proceed according
to (interim) standards derived from collaborative
efforts to produce the best possible investigations,
descriptions, and understandings, where “best”
includes an ongoing self-reflexive and negotiative
commitment to determining and trying out norms
and standards, and evaluating their effectiveness
and failures. (Code, 2008, p. 194)

While we wait for more evidence to come in, we
have some reason to favor feminist values.

“Doing science as a feminist” is thus an openended practice.

Who Knows? Epistemic Agency
Traditional empiricists viewed the agent of
knowledge as an individual person who has the
same sorts of rational capabilities as other persons, a laudably equalitarian account but one
that masks real differences among knowers.
Individual people have different resources for
understanding in accordance with their social
location, their socialization, and their developmental history. Addressing these variables
requires a more social account of the epistemic
agent, and feminist empiricists disagree about
what that account should be; they even consider
that different models of epistemic agency provide the desired purchase on different projects of
inquiry (Code, 2006a).
Feminists have transformed the empiricist
concept of the knowing subject through various
forms of attention to how individuals depend on
communities for knowledge. I will present their
accounts beginning with the most individualistic
and proceeding through degrees of sociality
toward the most communal account, and then to
one that disrupts feminist dependence on the
notion of community. To start, the traditional view
of individuals as agents of knowledge as revised
by Heidi Grasswick (2004) becomes individualsin-communities. More radically, granting central
roles to the community in which individuals are
only secondary participants and not direct agents,
Longino and Nelson argue that the practices of
people coordinated in their communal relationships allow individual experiences to become
significant. Communal processes qualify individual beliefs as objective according to Longino
(1990), and coherence with communal standards
qualifies individual observations as evidence
according to Nelson (1990). In Solomon’s “social
empiricism” (2001), individuals fall completely
out of the picture of scientific knowledge, because
scientific rationality only occurs in relationships
among competing theories, and so only at the
level of communities. The strength and role of
communities in knowledge remains highly contested, leading Lorraine Code (1996, 2006a)
instead to adopt a more flexible concept of society
to account for the social nature of knowledge.
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Grasswick (2004) rejects the traditional view
of the atomistic, self-sufficient individual but
argues that recognizing the (relational, dependent) individual as the agent of knowledge
remains necessary to make sense of the possibility of dissent and of how epistemic standards
become challenged (p. 97). A dynamic model of
epistemic agency becomes possible when we
identify agents as individuals-in-communities.
Although Grasswick’s location of epistemic
agency in individual persons is traditional, her
notion of the individual as socially dependent is
transformative. Gone are assumptions that the
knower has a given set of capacities for reasoning because, with Code (1991), Grasswick
insists that cognitive capacities are shaped by
psychological development and socialization.
“Individual knowers become epistemically differentiated along the lines of their communal
histories and memberships” (Grasswick, 2004,
p. 102). With Code again, Grasswick emphasizes
the need for trust between people and our dependence on systems of authority. Yet Grasswick’s
focus on communities goes beyond Code’s concern with interdependence by giving communities a critical role in the development and
support of individual understanding.
Grasswick (2004) insists that communities
provide “standards of evidence and bodies of
evidence” (p. 96) and that they prioritize some
epistemic values over others (p. 104), as Longino
(1990, 2004) and Nelson (1990) have also
argued. However, Grasswick addresses how
individuals are each involved in multiple communities that are conflicting, overlapping, and
vague, a complication that Longino and Nelson
barely acknowledge. They set aside the complexities of communities to focus on how a community can operate to provide objectivity and
evidence for beliefs.
Longino (1990) argues that critical discursive
communities grant objectivity to the beliefs of
individuals by constraining individual values.
“Individual values are held in check not by a
methodology but by social values” (p. 102).
Scientific practice is independent of individual
aims, except that individuals may work toward
building the appropriate communities, which are
those that engage a maximal number of different
points of view. Longino’s social standard for
assessing the objectivity of scientific discourse

involves four criteria for critical interpersonal
engagement. An objective community has the
following: (1) avenues for the expression and
diffusion of criticism; (2) uptake of, and response
to, criticism; (3) public standards by reference to
which theories and so forth are assessed; and, (4)
equality of intellectual authority (Longino, 1990,
1993). Communities that meet these criteria, to
the extent that they meet the criteria, produce
objective views that individuals may hold.
As inquirers, we choose, at least to a certain
extent, the cultures in which we participate, so,
as feminists, we can choose to whom we are
accountable, which community will guide our
beliefs; we can even choose combinations of
communities. “The feminist scientist is responsive to the ideals of a political community as
well as to some subset of the standards endorsed
in her or his scientific community” (Longino,
1990, p. 192). Longino’s advice to choose a
feminist community does not entail adopting
any particular methodology. Nevertheless “doing
science as a feminist” requires interpreting
empirical adequacy in terms of the concerns of
one’s chosen community, as described in the
previous section on epistemic values.
Similarly, for Nelson, individuals acquire their
scientific values from communities, but, for her,
the community plays a more comprehensive role.
The communal quality of the standards necessary
for a person to be said to know any particular
thing entails that some community to which that
person belongs must be the first and foremost
agent of knowledge. Individual people do not
have knowledge or evidence at all except insofar
as each participates in knowing communities.
Background beliefs and standards—for example,
regarding the techniques for collecting evidence
and how to make inferences from data—that we
share with other people provide support in varying degrees for our theories.
Nelson’s communal view of knowledge follows from her argument that sociopolitical criteria are among our tools for justifying knowledge
claims, again as outlined in the previous section.
The importance of sociopolitical values suggests that community is the primary epistemic
agent, which also is borne out by some commonsense observations. If any one member of a
community knows something, then some other
member could also know it—in this limited
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sense we may be interchangeable. “Acceptable
answers to the question ‘Who knows?’ include
‘Everyone,’ ‘All of us,’ ‘Lots of people,’ ‘Many
of us,’ but only very problematically ‘Only me’”
(Nelson, 1990, p. 255). Yet, “we know” doesn’t
mean “I and you and . . . you,” the “we” formed
from people that each of us knows. Especially in
“big science,” which brings together people
with vastly different skills who complete separate portions of calculation and experimentation, no one participant understands it all. So it
seems that “we” must know before any “I” can
begin to understand.
Methodologically, for Solomon, as individuals we cannot expect nor should we desire to be
free from bias, even to a degree, though we
should aim to pursue theories that have empirical success. We can address the role of nonempirical decision vectors only in social terms. For
individuals to recognize, assess, and redistribute
the nonempirical vectors in order to justify the
state of science requires a range of techniques.
[T]he identification of decision vectors and
improvement of their distribution . . . typically
require expertise, and, often, multidisciplinary
knowledge and skills. The critical training required
to identify presuppositions about gender, for example, is quite different from the psychological training and methods required to detect cognitive bias.
And the statistical techniques needed to assess the
role of birth order are quite different from scientific
and philosophical knowledge of theoretical constraints such as simplicity. (Solomon, 2001, p. 140)

Thus, for Solomon, methodological considerations must be both socially dispersed (as in
Nelson’s account) and multidisciplinary in order
to reveal imbalances in political values and
other nonempirical decision vectors.
Solomon’s naturalist demand for empirical
evidence to support epistemological evaluations
restrains her endorsement of Longino’s recommendation (her fourth criterion for critical
engagement) that we should join or develop egalitarian communities for the sake of improving our
investigations. Solomon admits that such social
democratization may benefit the identification of
political decision vectors. Yet, at best, only political decision vectors might receive improved attention, and we remain without evidence of even that.

Among feminist empiricists, Code stands out
for resisting commitment to any particular formulation of the epistemic agent and for recognizing
sources of agency aside from individuals-incommunities and human communities that
include our relationship with the biological and
ecological environment. Although Code treats as
fundamental the mutual dependence among individuals by suggesting that knowers are “second
persons,” a concept borrowed from Annette Baier
(2002), Code’s account resists any reference to
communities. She recognizes that knowledge
also develops in smaller and more fluid social
contexts—in a “society” that remains less clearly
defined and correspondingly more flexible than a
community. Code suggests that we engage in
“imaginaries” (a notion borrowed from Cornelius
Castoriadis). Instituted imaginaries provide
coherence among individual understandings, and
instituting imaginaries question the social structure and make new meanings possible (Code,
2006a, pp. 30–31).
Imaginaries are “habitats” that provide
“places to know,” Code (2006a) argues, in two
senses: as places from which we can begin
inquiry and as places that we must come to
understand if we are to be responsible knowers.
Learning about the contexts in which we know is
central to the methodology of most feminist
empiricism, and it is integral to naturalized or
naturalist epistemology. Naturalism treats knowers as part of nature, as subject to empirical
investigation, and thus seeks to use empirical
evidence especially from science to enrich and
strengthen epistemological theorizing.

Feminist Naturalism
Naturalized epistemologists begin with the
assumption that people actually have knowledge and hence with an implicit rejection of
global skepticism, the worry that knowledge is
not at all possible. The means for rejecting skepticism, according to Quine, is to use our science
itself to provide the explanation of how some
beliefs are justified, or warranted, over others.
Final answers regarding standards for inquiry
are not the goal, however, for thoroughgoing
naturalists. Such concerns risk begging the
question about the assumptions underpinning
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the sciences of cognition and ignoring the ways
that scientific investigation continues to develop.
Instead, jumping straight in to work with scientific findings provides a constructive “looping
effect” as systems of epistemic valuation are
continuously informed by empirical developments (Fellows, 2010).
The relevant sciences for Quine are the sciences of individual cognition, behaviorism, and
neuroscience that some feminist naturalists also
take up (Antony, 2003; Duran, 1993). Even for
Quine, further forms of science may shed light
on how people’s experiences can justify their
beliefs, and thus his reformed empiricism complements Kuhn’s historicism (Hundleby, 2002).
Making use of all of our available resources to
scrutinize our understandings reflects naturalism’s inspiration by the 18th-century empiricism of David Hume, which Baier (2002)
argues has a distinctly social cast that suits it for
feminism (pp. 46–50).
As part of the process of naturalizing epistemology, feminists critically analyze the methodologies and basic concepts of the contemporary
cognitive sciences that inform their naturalism—
whether the sciences of individual psychology
favored by Quine or the Kuhnian and postKuhnian social studies of knowledge. Feminist
naturalists recognize that the scientific resources
for epistemology themselves are subject to
improvement. After all, science is open-ended in
several different ways due to the open-endedness
of the future, natural human ingenuity and creativity, and even the concepts we create (Rooney,
2003, pp. 218–219). The feminist treatment of
the scientific resources for theorizing about
knowledge as dynamic produces “a verb-sense
of epistemology, . . . a sense of doing epistemology, of reflecting in a systematic way on knowledge and knowing while drawing ongoing
critical attention to particular kinds of motivating concerns, questions, and methods in the
way one does epistemology” (p. 207, emphasis
original). This reflexive development of empirical standards contrasts with the usual epistemological pursuit of a “final” view, epistemology as
a noun: for example, coherentism, positivism,
empiricism. Such static treatments of knowledge
become dynamic and defeasible in feminist
hands, subject to challenge and change over time.
In the context of transforming claims about what
counts as knowledge, what remains continuous

and distinctive in feminist epistemology, and in
feminist naturalism especially, is ongoing information by feminism and by science, even as these
change over time (Rooney, 2003).

Controversies About
Feminist Empiricism
Feminist empiricism rarely receives complimentary treatment in overviews of feminist epistemologies and science studies, in large part because
it has been misunderstood. The theoretical conservativeness of empiricism does not entail a
political conservativeness. The most potentially
regressive approach to feminist empiricism may
be naturalism because it defers to scientific input,
which inevitably reflects the status quo. Yet the
reflexive revolutionary spirit of naturalism challenges even its own empiricist precepts.

The Conservative Quality
of Empiricism
Naturalism may seem to resist progress in
several different ways. Some concerns involve
the critical weakness of naturalism and the patriarchal content of the science it relies on. Another
concern is that empirical understanding, naturalized or not, can never be sufficient for political
analysis. Feminist naturalists account for the fact
that there are always prior epistemologies and
other existing influences on the ways that we
evaluate beliefs, and they demand continuous
scrutiny of these value systems as concrete constitutive circumstances for all our inquiries.
Relying on science, as naturalists do, seems
to at least limit and perhaps exclude the possibility of establishing new ideals for human reasoning, not only because science may employ
regressive politics but also because formulating
ideals is not the job of science—it’s the job of
philosophy. At best, science describes only
people’s success with respect to accepted ideals,
without interrogating those standards, deferring
to existing standards in a way that discourages
some feminist empiricists, including Longino
(1993), from naturalism. Further, naturalism’s
tendency toward scientism—deference to scientific evaluations—may be inherently quietist,
suppressing dispute. In practice, many of the
central tenets of science are beyond scrutiny,
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even though in some ideal forms science may be
self-revising (Linker, 2003).
The patriarchal social system produces almost
all of the science available that might provide
empirical standards for evaluating knowledge
claims. As a practical political resource, science
has a history of resisting social explanations for
gendered differences and seeking instead
accounts based on biology that portray the differences as relatively immutable. The tendency
in the scientific study of knowledge to accept
gender as given and ahistorical seems to be especially strong when women’s capacities have
been judged to be inferior. Consider that some
significant gendered differences have been found
with spatial ability, but the differences are so
small as to be easily explained by differences in
socialization. Yet researchers persist in looking
for biological reasons for gendered differences
in understanding (Fausto-Sterling, 1985, 1992),
such that cognitive science seems bent on justifying women’s low social status. Psychologists
resolutely search for differences, even when
empirical results consistently reveal gender parity in verbal ability.
For such reasons, taking up scientific accounts
of gender can be regressive and epistemologically dubious, especially when it comes to cognition. For instance, scientific accounts of
cognition support claims made by Jane Duran
(2001) that women benefit from an especially
“relational” view of themselves and the world.8
Duran seems to be among the most thoroughgoing of feminist naturalisms because she engages
deeply in empirical research in both cognitive
science (1993) and contemporary cultural studies (2001). However, that depth is at the expense
of considering other empirical factors, including
socialization, that reveal how gender dichotomies in cognition can be symptoms of oppression. It ignores a competing account that has
more thorough empirical support, the evidence
that women are socialized to participate in and
even facilitate their oppression.
Adherence to the empiricist tradition also can
be used to rule out the relevance of social liberation movements to fostering advances in science
(Harding, 1986, pp. 25–26). Thus, empiricism’s
future can seem to be radical only insofar as its
internal conflicts spark a move away from the
empiricism itself. As Maureen Linker argues
(2003), empirical evidence seems to have little

impact on the normative correction of many
forms of human knowledge, such as those
assessed in terms of logical, linguistic, and moral
truths.
Yet, feminist empiricism involves accounting
for the relationship between values traditionally
considered to be noncognitive—including social
liberation and morality—and their cognitive
counterparts, such as empirical adequacy.
“Experience,” the key concept in empiricism, is
a very broad and complex notion for feminist
empiricists that extends beyond and complicates
simple sensory experience. Cultural resources,
including some rudimentary prior epistemology,
inform any empirical knowledge. Our studies in
psychology and the history of science, for
instance, cannot move ahead without some
notion of what needs examination, without a
functional ontology, an account of the nature of
the world that shows how meaningful inquiry
can be possible. Cognitive scientists generally
assume (1) that knowledge takes the form of
discrete propositional beliefs regarding isolated
statements of fact (e.g., “the breadbox is larger
than the teacup”), (2) that individuals are the
agents of knowledge, and (3) that science is the
best example of knowledge. However, “stipulation . . . simply begs the question against more
robust forms of naturalizing epistemology where
questions about the cognitive demarcation and
delineation of beliefs are open to question”
(Rooney, 2003, p. 216). No scientific authority
absolves the need to scrutinize background concepts and values, whether they include the sexism of cognitive science or the empirical
adequacy of psychoanalysis.
Background epistemologies belong to the
communal resources that Nelson argues are necessary for individual knowledge of any kind.
Yet her picture of communities as prior to individual knowledge seems to entail that what can
be known is static and that individual knowledge is passive. So Edrie Sobstyl (2004) argues
that science and common sense are in constant
flux, and in dynamic interaction with individual
experience.
This creates opportunities for knowledge to grow
and change. . . . The fact that women alter their
behavior in order to avoid being targets of sexual
assault shows that they recognize the prevailing
beliefs of a patriarchal community. But the fact
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that women resist such constraints on their
behavior and demand freedom from sexual predation shows that our common sense and gendered social and political experiences have a
concrete impact on what we know. It is not helpful to say that this resistance is entirely derived
from the community, because our community
has not been particularly willing to warrant such
ideals. (p. 131)

Thus Sobstyl argues that we can revise and
complete Nelson’s holism by allowing for a
symmetrical relationship between embodied
individuals and communities rather than by giving absolute priority to communities. Individual
knowledge may be derived from communal
knowledge, as Nelson argues, or it may be situated in or interdependent with communal
knowledge in the way that Grasswick and
Sobstyl suggest.
There are many reasons to believe that the
program of naturalizing epistemology will change
substantially in the future. To begin with, naturalizing epistemology is a project currently in its
very early stages. Even those who are sympathetic to naturalism or describe themselves as
naturalists are “slow to renounce the old modes
of legitimation” (Roth, 2003, p. 296), and what
the new scientific modes are, exactly, remains
unclear. In addition, the development of naturalism has been slow because naturalists have had
to spend a good deal of their time defending the
importance and viability of naturalist techniques
(Rooney, 2003).
Naturalism is a continuous process, and new
ways of viewing knowledge constantly emerge
from the open texture of science, as Rooney
(2003) argues.
At the very least, I maintain, naturalists must have
a . . . verb-sense of science—that is, [of] science as
a diversity of dynamic disciplines, the concepts,
questions, and findings of which are continually
being modified in relation to changing conditions,
including the changing conditions of empirical
investigation and the changing social and political
worlds within which such investigation is situated.
(pp. 218–219)

New scientific tools may emerge merely because
science progresses in addressing people’s
changing concerns and because science may

respond to new questions that we have about
knowledge, including feminist questions.

Naturalism Supporting Rationalism
The self-critical impulse in naturalist epistemology takes the general form of requiring
empiricism to be based itself on empirical investigation. The scientific evidence concerning
human inquiry thus could turn out to support a
nonempiricist view of knowledge, to make available “genuinely novel and transformative philosophical strategies” that explain how bias can
play a positive role in reasoning (Antony, 2003,
p. 142). Indeed, some evidence supports the
rationalist view of mind, harking back to René
Descartes, that people have native intellectual
capacities, such as for language, and that, in this
way, one’s ability to know is independent of
one’s past experience (Antony, 2003).
On the basis of her rationalist (but naturalistically supported) view that knowers rely on innate
mental capacities, Antony adopts the further
rationalist view that knowers are interchangeable, which most feminists find objectionable
because it denies the impact on knowledge of
developmental history, social situation, and different forms of embodiment. Moreover, the
bodies that do play a role in Antony’s work and
that provide one’s perspective on the world do
not have “bias” in the usual sense that differentiates individuals. The forms of prejudgment that
are properly called biases at best are merely
analogous to the shared cognitive dispositions
that can make our bodies seem interchangeable.
Yet, Antony’s argument demonstrates that
changes in scientific accounts of cognition could,
in principle, undermine the traditional empiricist
view of the mind and the entailed epistemology
(Campbell, 1998, p. 33). Such a turnabout is possible because developing scientific perspectives on
knowledge is an ongoing activity, and this is a
further reason to view naturalism in a “verb-sense”
(Rooney, 2003). One may practice epistemological naturalism continuously, and ongoing naturalist revision entails that feminist empiricists may
find themselves engaging in quite different forms
of theorizing than that with which they started.
Naturalizing is never complete because epistemology is never finally, ultimately naturalized.
Empiricism remains, at the moment and for
the foreseeable future, a viable starting place or
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background epistemology for naturalist methods.
Antony’s argument does not succeed in its attempt
to turn naturalism toward rationalism. Admittedly,
a rationalist view of the mind—for example, the
view of Descartes or Noam Chomsky—might
reflect some evidence better than the behaviorism
that Quine favored. Even Quine considers behaviorist psychology useful only for individuating
belief states. Behaviorism is not sufficient support
for epistemology because behaviors are neither the
same as beliefs nor sufficient to explain them—a
task for which he suggests biology, especially
neurophysiology (Nelson, 1990, pp. 126–128).
Naturalist explanation must also account for
the impact of different social situations and different bodies with various levels and forms of
cognitive development (Code, 2006a), something
only promised by Anthony’s rationalism and not
delivered. These nonbehavioral factors affect
neurophysiology, including language development (Nelson, 1990, pp. 286–287), and so have
implications not only for Quinean empiricism but
also for any rationalism that is accountable to
empirical evidence. The need to address how the
social world impacts evidence inspired Quine’s
argument for naturalism (Nelson, 1990, p. 288;
Quine, 1960). Therefore, to ignore social influences, as Antony’s rationalist move does, is to
depart from the basic spirit of naturalism rather
than to defeat it on its own terms.

Conclusion
Employing empiricism provides feminists with
valuable purchase in the dominant culture and
access to the power of scientific resources. These
advantages imbue empiricism with a radical
potential that both critics of feminist empiricism
(Harding, 1986) and defenders of it (Campbell,
1998; Nelson, 1990) recognize to include strategic rhetoric and to go far beyond rhetorical significance. Further, supporters argue that feminist
naturalism demonstrates the radical future of
feminist empiricism because it holds all the
strengths of the early alternative approaches
known as feminist standpoint theory and feminist postmodernism. Feminist naturalism, specifically, provides clear grounds for evaluating
not only beliefs but also values and practices
that include political views (Tuana, 1992). The
broad scope of naturalist critique allows Antony

to find in it potential support for rationalism,
showing that, not only in principle but also in
practice, naturalism has revolutionary potential.
Naturalism’s open-endedness suggests further
that feminist empiricism may be mutually complementary with other feminist epistemologies,
and encourages treating epistemological choices
as provisional, according to the problem at hand,
rather than as definitive. Looking to “small”
places in Code’s ecological manner requires a
dynamic sensitivity, strategizing as activists:
Choos[e] . . . points of concentration, of focus;
discern . . . the gaps where intervention and contestation have the best hopes of entering, and
work . . . to ensure that their effects will
spread . . . [A]ctivists, both singly and collectively,
have to know a lot just to see what might be possible and may have to develop strategic compromises to be able to work toward sometimes distant
and often unstable goals. (Code, 2008, p. 201)

Methodologies may be taken up as guerrilla
strategies based on shared oppositional consciousness that “operates like the clutch of an
automobile: the mechanism that permits the
driver to select, engage, and disengage gears in
a system for the transmission of power”
(Sandoval, 1991, p. 14). This U.S. third world
feminist strategy identified by Chela Sandoval
encourages flexibility in taking up the competing political tactics of liberal, Marxist, radical,
and socialist feminism, and it denies the need to
commit to a final strategy. Likewise, shifting
among empiricist and other methodologies
keeps inquirers free from the stagnation of any
static epistemology. So feminist empiricism
continues its radical progression by transforming from a hegemonic strategy into a “processual relationship” (Sandoval, 1991, p. 24) with
only tentative “places to know” (Code, 2006a).
Although Code’s account most clearly supports recognizing as provisional the naturalist
employment of empiricism or of any other epistemology, her view resonates with other forms
of feminist empiricism. Consider that because
different methodologies and epistemologies,
including rationalism, have some empirical support, Solomon would advise methodological
dissent. Keeping different options at hand also
serves Rooney’s “verb-sense” of epistemology
that recognizes the open-endedness of human

42– • –PART I   FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE BUILDING

inquiry. Finally, this pluralism can be expressed
without assuming naturalism: Longino’s (1990,
2004) requirement of ongoing critical engagement among divergent perspectives can apply to
feminist epistemologies and methodologies as
much as it does to science itself:

4. Might the different epistemologies work better
in addressing different forms of research?
Different methodologies? Different disciplines?
Different research topics?

Online Resources

The feminist interventions I imagine will be local
(i.e., specific to a particular area of research), they
may not be exclusive (i.e., different feminist perspectives may be represented in theorizing), and
they will be in some way continuous with existing
scientific work. (Longino, 1987, p. 62)

The Thinking Meat Project—Explaining Female
Orgasm: An Interview With Elisabeth Lloyd

There is no one feminist empiricism, but many
feminist empiricisms, an epistemological plurality that can be justified—both politically and
epistemologically and from an individual and a
community level—according to the various
views of feminist empiricists.

This open-source encyclopedia features articles by
experts in specific fields that are periodically updated.

Discussion Questions
1. How might a feminist empiricist view of evidence or objectivity apply beyond the domain
of science to everyday knowledge? Consider
how a feminist empiricist would shop for groceries or plant a garden.
2. How might scientists apply Code’s view of
ecological thinking?
a. Grasswick’s notion of knowers as individualsin-communities may be a helpful starting
point. How might a scientist present herself
as an individual-in-communities? How
might social scientists view their subjects as
individuals-in-communities? Will this vary
with the level at which we recognize socie
ties or communities?
b. What other aspects of scientists and subjects
of study must we address to achieve ecological thinking? Is this different for different fields of inquiry?
3. What do you think are the particular strengths
and weaknesses of feminist empiricism? Why
might it be useful to distinguish feminist
empiricism from other feminist epistemologies in some contexts but not in others? Social
contexts? Historical contexts? Geographical
contexts? Regarding some knowers but not
others? Different bodies?

http://thinkingmeat.com/newsblog/?page_id=1201
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/

• Anderson, E., Feminist epistemology and
philosophy of science, March 16, 2011,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminismepistemology/
• Fehr, C., Feminist philosophy of biology,
June 22, 2011, forthcoming, Fall 2011 edition, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-philosophy-biology/
Many feminist empiricists, especially
Fausto-Sterling, Lloyd, and Longino, have
made important contributions to the philosophy of biology.
• Garry, A., Analytic feminism, April 29, 2004,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femap
proach-analytic/
Feminist empiricism can be viewed as the
epistemological wing of analytic feminism,
given that empiricism has been the central
epistemology and essential to the prevalence
of the “analytic” approach in 20th-century
Anglo-American philosophy.
• Stanford, K., Underdetermination of scientific
theory, August 12, 2009, http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/
index.html
This theory associated with Quine’s naturalism explains the interrelation of epistemic
and non-epistemic values for many feminist
empiricists.
• Whipps, J., Pragmatist feminism, July 9,
2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femap
proach-pragmatism/
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Feminist empiricists engage with pragmatist philosophy primarily through the works
of Quine, but other feminists engage different elements and authors in the pragmatist
tradition.

Relevant Journals
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society
Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge,
Culture, and Policy

Notes
1. Speaking broadly of the global North is not to
deny the variability within this historical culture, and
is a somewhat artificial description, but it helps to
track connections among the various manifestations
and implications of European colonization and contemporary capitalism.
2. The connections between empiricism and liberalism may be deeper than a mere analogy, as Steven
Shapin and Simon Schaffer suggest in Leviathan and
the Air-Pump (1989).
3. Although social gender and biological sex are
deeply integrated, distinguishing them is valuable for
addressing the more flexible social and political
influences. Furthermore, the sex of an organism as a
whole has no necessary or sufficient connection with
an aspect or portion of the body. Not even chromosomes or genitalia sex a body.
4. Lloyd’s failure to consider such implications
led to some misunderstanding of the intentions behind
her research, which she has remedied in follow-up
articles by addressing its ramifications for women’s
sexuality. See the interview with Lloyd listed in the
“Online Resources” section of this chapter.
5. Practices of testing and evaluation as well as
the standards of factuality, evidence, and objectivity
are part of the “context of justification” in traditional
empiricism, providing epistemic justification or warrant. By contrast, heuristics and theory generation
that concern standpoint theorists are considered part
of the “context of discovery.”
6. Harding (1986) similarly criticized early or
“spontaneous” forms of feminist empiricism for
maintaining that social values both matter and do not
matter in science.

7. When there is consensus, dissent approaches zero,
and the conditions (1) through (3) are met as follows:
1. One theory has all the empirical successes
(explains all the different observations);
2. All the empirical vectors support that theory (productive scientific methods all fall
under the theory).
3. With maintained consensus, nonempirical
decision vectors all begin to support the
one theory.
8. Duran bases her view of the feminine self on
object-relations theory, which generally falls under
feminist standpoint theory (Harding, 1986), but she
aims to develop a naturalist version.
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